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Northern Ireland should not have received an invitation to the ‘10 years of devolution’ 
celebration party! Power was devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly and its 
Executive Committee of Ministers on Thursday 2
nd
 December 1999 following the signing 
of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement on 10
th
 April 1998. Things went downhill quickly 
thereafter! The Blair Government saw devolution as a mechanism to advance the peace 
process by encouraging republicans and loyalists into an elected assembly and weaning 
them away from violence. The (then) Ulster Unionist Party leader agreed to share power 
with Sinn Féin on the condition that they decommissioned their weaponry. When this 
didn’t happen, suspension of the devolved Assembly followed on 11th February 2000. 
This fitful process was to continue and devolution was suspended indefinitely for the 
fourth time by the (then) Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, John Reid, in October 
2002 due to ‘a lack of trust and loss of confidence on both sides of the community’ 
precipitated, in part, by accusations made against Sinn Féin of intelligence gathering in 
Stormont - a charge vehemently denied by republicans.  
 
Direct rule from Westminster was to remain in place for over 4 years until a new round of 
talks between the British and Irish Government took place at St Andrews in October 
2006. The discussions centred on two issues: the need to support policing and the rule of 
law across the whole community leading to the devolution of policing and justice; and 
support for power-sharing and the political institutions.  The British and Irish 
Government reached agreement on these issues in the St Andrews Agreement of 13
th
 
October 2006, the details of which were given legislative effect in the Northern Ireland 
(St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006. The Act made provisions for a new transitional 
Assembly, set out a timetable to restore devolution, the date for the third election to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, and made important amendments to the Northern Ireland Act 
1998 which came into force with the restoration of devolved government.  
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In the event, elections took place in March 2007 and devolution was restored on 8
th
 May 
2007 following a high profile meeting and media event at which Ian Paisley (then DUP 
leader) and Gerry Adams (the leader of Sinn Féin) agreed to establish a power sharing 
Executive comprising: 4 DUP, 3 Sinn Féin, 2 Ulster Unionists and 1 SDLP ministers with 
a DUP First Minister and Sinn Féin deputy First Minister. Northern Ireland has witnessed 
many ‘historic’ moments but the political imagery of Ian Paisley and Gerry Adams 
making a joint televised commitment to power sharing was captivating. The Northern 
Ireland Assembly and Executive have been in operation since then. 
 
Unlike Scotland and Wales, devolution in Northern Ireland is inextricably linked to the 
divisive issues which precipitated its inception and characterize its operation in practice. 
Hence, although the First Minister proudly claims that devolution has now been in place 
for the longest continuous period in almost forty years, there was a hiatus in June 2008 
when the Executive did not meet for 5 months over disagreement on major policy issues. 
Key areas of contention include: the end of academic selection – essentially the abolition 
of grammar schools; granting legal status to the Irish language; building a ‘conflict 
transformation centre’ or ‘shrine to terrorists’ (republican and loyalist descriptors, 
respectively) at the site of the former Maze prison; and how to address the vexed issue of 
victims of the conflict. The nature of the consociational arrangements which constitute 
power sharing, where key decisions are taken on a cross-community basis through 
parallel consent or a weighted majority, means that the DUP and Sinn Féin can exercise a 
mutual veto. This has lead to gridlock in the decision making process over contentious 
issues and marginalization of other political parties in the Executive (SDLP and Ulster 
Unionist Party). 
 
The Executive’s Programme for Government 2008-11 makes a commitment to building 
‘a shared and better future for all’. What is significant about this pledge is the word 
‘shared’ in the context of Northern Ireland where 95% of children are educated in single 
identity schools and there are few mixed social housing areas. The direct rule 
administration had developed a policy and strategic framework to improve good relations 
in Northern Ireland entitled A Shared Future (March 2005) which rejected ‘separate but 
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equal’ communities as an option. The returning devolved administration abandoned this 
policy document and committed to a replacement entitled Cohesion, Sharing and 
Integration. More than two years on, and following a plea from outgoing Chief 
Constable, Sir Hugh Orde, that the absence of leadership on this policy was causing a 
political vacuum, both the DUP and Sinn Féin have published separate versions of the 
document, accusing each other of bad faith and blocking consensus on the issue.  
 
Notwithstanding some expected policy disagreements the key prize is that there is now a 
mandatory coalition of 4 political parties sharing power and there are realistic prospects 
of its sustainability. The Executive and Assembly can also point to some policy 
successes: free public transport is available to all those over 60; the regional rates 
(Northern Ireland did not replace household rates with council tax) have been frozen for 
three years; prescriptions charged have been abolished; there has been a major investment 
in infrastructure projects in schools, roads and hospitals; and water charges have been 
deferred, to list just some of the achievements. While these policies have been popular 
with the electorate they are predicated on an expanding public sector budget yet they 
include measures which limit the size of the Executive’s resource base. One politician 
described the situation in this way: 
 
We avoid the hard issues because we don’t want to impact negatively on power 
sharing arrangements. The threat in these circumstances is not as it was in the past 
to the overall stability of the institutions, but it poses real questions about the 
effectiveness of governance in terms of delivering public policies for Northern 
Ireland. So far we have been let off the hook because of the generous financial 
settlement from the Treasury and huge international good-will but these simply 
paper over the cracks for so long. Ultimately it is resources which will challenge 
the under-performance of the Assembly (Interview with senior Alliance Party 
MLA). 
 
In fact, the resources issue is currently exercising the Executive, in particular the 
Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety where the Minister (Michael 
McGimpsey) has proposed cuts of 150 beds in the Royal and City Hospitals, Belfast and 
embargoed recruitment of nursing posts. These proposals/actions, the minister argued, are 
due to a combination of pressures on health spending including the large bill for swine flu 
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(£77m) and the substantial deficits which health trusts have now incurred in their revenue 
spending. Despite being the largest budget holder in the devolved administration, 
overseeing 47.5% of the total spend (£8.6b), the Health Minister described the financial 
circumstances in his department as facing ‘a bleak future where we have given all we can 
give in cost-cutting terms’. His political opponents, in particular DUP members of the 
Health Committee in the Assembly, accuse him of poor stewardship of his department 
and cynically directing cuts in areas most likely to attract high profile media coverage. 
Westminster electioneering has already begun! 
 
The Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister recently published its first 
‘delivery report’ on the Programme for Government 2008-11 within which the key 
priority is to grow a dynamic innovative economy. In addition, the devolved government 
aims to: 
 Promote tolerance, inclusion and well-being. 
 Invest to build infrastructure. 
 Deliver modern, high quality and efficient public services. 
 Protect and enhance the environment and natural resources. 
 
Progress against these goals was reported by officials within the 11 devolved government 
departments using the traffic light red/amber/green system where: red indicates little or 
no progress; amber progress is less progress than expected; and green suggests good 
progress. Of the 66 key goals and commitment made by the devolved government, 8% 
(n=5) were reported as red, with a further 30% (n=20) amber; and 62% (n=41) green – a 
creditable performance. However, this way of monitoring progress is a highly 
impressionistic means of judging implementation of the Programme for Government not 
least because it offers no evidence as to how assignment to these three categories 
(red/amber/green) was arrived at. Add to this the fact that public service agreements 
(PSAs) in the Programme for Government were devised by civil servants who are now 
self-reporting progress against their own targets implies a less-than-objective exercise. 
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Compare the assessment of devolved government by officials with data gathered from 
approximately 1,200 respondents in the Northern Ireland Life and Times probability 
survey conducted between October 2008 and February 2009. Interviewees were asked 
‘how much do you think the Assembly has achieved’? The results showed that 73% of 
respondents felt the Assembly had achieved ‘a little’ or ‘nothing’. Officials have a very 
different view of Programme for Government delivery than members of the public. 
 
None of the above should be read as an indictment of the significant political progress 
which has been made in reaching a power sharing settlement, coalition government, 
stable political institutions and a significant decline in violence. On the contrary, we 
acknowledge and applaud these successes. What it does show, however, is that locally 
elected politicians have found the transition from ‘power without responsibility’ or 
denouncing direct rule British ministers, to ownership of, and accountability for, public 
policies more difficult than they first anticipated. 
 
 
